| FEDERALIST
No. 1 |
General
Introduction |
| FEDERALIST
No. 6 |
Concerning
Dangers from Dissensions Between the States |
| FEDERALIST
No. 7 |
Concerning
Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (con't) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 8 |
The Consequences
of Hostilities Between the States |
| FEDERALIST
No. 9 |
The Union as a
Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection |
| FEDERALIST
No. 11 |
The Utility of
the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy |
| FEDERALIST
No. 12 |
The Utility of
the Union In Respect to Revenue |
| FEDERALIST
No. 13 |
Advantage of the
Union in Respect to Economy in Government |
| FEDERALIST
No. 15 |
The Insufficiency
of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union |
| FEDERALIST
No. 16 |
The Insufficiency
of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 17 |
The Insufficiency
of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 18 |
The Insufficiency
of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) (with
Madison) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 19 |
The Insufficiency
of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) (with
Madison) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 20 |
The Insufficiency
fo the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con't) (with
Madison) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 21 |
Other Defects of
the Present Confederation |
| FEDERALIST
No. 22 |
Other Defects of
the Present Confederation (con't) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 23 |
The Necessity of
a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the
Preservation of the Union |
| FEDERALIST
No. 24 |
The Powers
Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered |
| FEDERALIST
No. 25 |
The Powers
Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered (con't) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 26 |
The Idea of
Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common
Defense Considered |
| FEDERALIST
No. 27 |
The Idea of
Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common
Defense Considered (con't) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 28 |
The Idea of
Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common
Defense Considered (con't) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 29 |
Concerning the
Militia |
| FEDERALIST
No. 30 |
Concerning the
General Power of Taxation |
| FEDERALIST
No. 31 |
Concerning the
General Power of Taxation (con't) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 32 |
Concerning the
General Power of Taxation (con't) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 33 |
Concerning the
General Power of Taxation (con't) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 34 |
Concerning the
General Power of Taxation (con't) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 35 |
Concerning the
General Power of Taxation (con't) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 36 |
Concerning the
General Power of Taxation (con't) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 49 |
Method of
Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of
Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention
(Hamilton or Madison) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 50 |
Periodical
Appeals to the People Considered (Hamilton or Madison) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 51 |
The Structure of
the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances
Between the Different Departments (Hamilton or Madison) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 52 |
The House of
Representatives (Hamilton or Madison) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 53 |
The House of
Representatives (con't) (Hamilton or Madison) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 54 |
The Apportionment
of Members Among the States (Hamilton or Madison) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 55 |
The Total Number
of the House of Representatives (Hamilton or Madison) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 56 |
The Total Number
of the House of Representatives (con't) (Hamilton or Madison) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 57 |
The Alleged
Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of
the Many Considered in Connection with Representation HAMILTON
(Hamilton or Madison) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 58 |
Objection That
The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of
Population Demands Considered |
| FEDERALIST
No. 59 |
Concerning the
Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members |
| FEDERALIST
No. 60 |
Concerning the
Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 61 |
Concerning the
Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con't) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 62 |
The Senate
(Hamilton or Madison) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 63 |
The Senate (con't)
(Hamilton or Madison) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 65 |
The Powers of the
Senate (con't) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 66 |
Objections to the
Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further
Considered |
| FEDERALIST
No. 67 |
The Executive
Department |
| FEDERALIST
No. 68 |
The Mode of
Electing the President |
| FEDERALIST
No. 69 |
The Real
Character of the Executive |
| FEDERALIST
No. 70 |
The Executive
Department Further Considered |
| FEDERALIST
No. 71 |
The Duration in
Office of the Executive |
| FEDERALIST
No. 72 |
The Same Subject
Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered |
| FEDERALIST
No. 73 |
The Provision For
The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power |
| FEDERALIST
No. 74 |
The Command of
the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the
Executive |
| FEDERALIST
No. 75 |
The Treaty-Making
Power of the Executive |
| FEDERALIST
No. 76 |
The Appointing
Power of the Executive |
| FEDERALIST
No. 77 |
The Appointing
Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered |
| FEDERALIST
No. 78 |
The Judiciary
Department |
| FEDERALIST
No. 79 |
The Judiciary (con't) |
| FEDERALIST
No. 80 |
The Powers of the
Judiciary |
| FEDERALIST
No. 81 |
The Judiciary
Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority |
| FEDERALIST
No. 82 |
The Judiciary
Continued |
| FEDERALIST
No. 83 |
The Judiciary
Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury |
| FEDERALIST
No. 84 |
Certain General
and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and
Answered |
| FEDERALIST
No. 85 |
Concluding
Remarks |