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Federal
Farmer, no. 11
10 Jan. 1788 Storing 2.8.147
When the confederation was formed, it was considered essentially
necessary that the members of congress should at any time be recalled by
their respective states, when the states should see fit, and others be
sent in their room. I do not think it less necessary that this principle
should be extended to the members of congress under the new
constitution, and especially to the senators. I have had occasion
several times to observe, that let us form a federal constitution as
extensively, and on the best principles in our power, we must, after
all, trust a vast deal to a few men, who, far removed from their
constituents, will administer the federal government; there is but
little danger these men will feel too great a degree of dependence: the
necessary and important object to be attended to, is to make them feel
dependant enough. Men elected for several years, several hundred miles
distant from their states, possessed of very extensive powers, and the
means of paying themselves, will not, probably, be oppressed with a
sense of dependence and responsibility.
The senators will represent sovereignties, which generally have, and
always ought to retain, the power of recalling their agents; the
principle of responsibility is strongly felt in men who are liable to be
recalled and censured for their misconduct; and, if we may judge from
experience, the latter will not abuse the power of recalling their
members; to possess it, will, at least be a valuable check. It is in the
nature of all delegated power, that the constituents should retain the
right to judge concerning the conduct of their representatives; they
must exercise the power, and their decision itself, their approving or
disapproving that conduct implies a right, a power to continue in
office, or to remove from it. But whenever the substitute acts under a
constitution, then it becomes necessary that the power of recalling him
be expressed. The reasons for lodging a power to recall are stronger, as
they respect the senate, than as they respect the representatives; the
latter will be more frequently elected, and changed of course, and being
chosen by the people at large, it would be more difficult for the people
than for the legislatures to take the necessary measures for recalling:
but even the people, if the powers will be more beneficial to them than
injurious, ought to possess it. The people are not apt to wrong a man
who is steady and true to their interests; they may for a while be
misled by party representations, and leave a good man out of office
unheard; but every recall supposes a deliberate decision, and a fair
hearing; and no man who believes his conduct proper, and the result of
honest views, will be the less useful in his public character, on
account of the examination his actions may be liable to; and a man
conscious of the contrary conduct, ought clearly to be restrained by the
apprehensions of a trial. I repeat it, it is interested combinations and
factions we are particularly to guard against in the federal government,
and all the rational means that can be put into the hands of the people
to prevent them, ought to be provided and furnished for them. Where
there is a power to recall, trusty sentinels among the people, or in the
state legislatures, will have a fair opportunity to become useful. If
the members in congress from the states join in such combinations, or
favour them, or pursue a pernicious line of conduct, the most attentive
among the people, or in the state legislatures, may formally charge them
before their constituents: the very apprehensions of such constitutional
charges may prevent many of the evils mentioned, and the recalling the
members of a single state, a single senator, or representative, may
often prevent many more; nor do I, at present, discover any danger in
such proceedings, as every man who shall move for a recall will put his
reputation at stake, to shew he has reasonable grounds for his motion;
and it is not probable such motions will be made unless there be good
apparent grounds for succeeding; nor can the charge or motion be any
thing more than the attack of an individual or individuals, unless a
majority of the constituents shall see cause to go into the enquiry.
Further, the circumstance of such a power being lodged in the
constituents, will tend continually to keep up their watchfulness, as
well as the attention and dependence of the federal senators and
representatives.
By the confederation it is provided, that no delegate shall serve more
than three years in any term of six years, and thus, by the forms of the
government, a rotation of members is produced: a like principle has been
adopted in some of the state governments, and also in some antient and
modern republics. Whether this exclusion of a man for a given period,
after he shall have served a given time, ought to be ingra[f]ted into a
constitution or not, is a question, the proper decision materially
depends upon the leading features of the government: some governments
are so formed as to produce a sufficient fluctuation and change of
members of course, in the ordinary course of elections, proper numbers
of new members are, from time to time, brought into the legislature, and
a proportionate number of old ones go out, mix, and become diffused
among the people. This is the case with all numerous representative
legislatures, the members of which are frequently elected, and
constantly within the view of their constituents. This is the case with
our state governments, and in them a constitutional rotation is
unimportant. But in a government consisting of but a few members,
elected for long periods, and far removed from the observation of the
people, but few changes in the ordinary course of elections take place
among the members; they become in some measure a fixed body, and often
inattentive to the public good, callous, selfish, and the fountain of
corruption. To prevent these evils, and to force a principle of pure
animation into the federal government, which will be formed much in this
last manner mentioned, and to produce attention, activity, and a
diffusion of knowledge in the community, we ought to establish among
others the principle of rotation. Even good men in office, in time,
imperceptibly lose sight of the people, and gradually fall into measures
prejudicial to them. It is only a rotation among the members of the
federal legislature I shall contend for: judges and officers at the
heads of the judicial and executive departments, are in a very different
situation, their offices and duties require the information and studies
of many years for performing them in a manner advantageous to the
people. These judges and officers must apply their whole time to the
detail business of their offices, and depend on them for their support:
then they always act under masters or superiors, and may be removed from
office for misconduct; they pursue a certain round of executive
business: their offices must be in all societies confined to a few men,
because but few can become qualified to fill them: and were they, by
annual appointments, open to the people at large, they are offices of
such a nature as to be of no service to them; they must leave these
offices in the possession of the few individuals qualified to fill them,
or have them badly filled. In the judicial and executive departments
also, the body of the people possess a large share of power and
influence, as jurors and subordinate officers, among whom there are many
and frequent rotations. But in every free country the legislatures are
all on a level, and legislation becomes partial whenever, in practice,
it rests for any considerable time in a few hands. It is the true
republican principle to diffuse the power of making the laws among the
people, and so to modify the forms of the government as to draw in turn
the well informed of every class into the legislature.
To determine the propriety or impropriety of this rotation, we must take
the inconveniencies as well as the advantages attending it into view: on
the one hand, by this rotation, we may sometimes exclude good men from
being elected. On the other hand, we guard against those pernicious
connections, which usually grow up among men left to continue long
periods in office, we increase the number of those who make the laws and
return to their constituents; and thereby spread information, and
preserve a spirit of activity and investigation among the people: hence
a balance of interests and exertions are preserved, and the ruinous
measures of factions rendered more impracticable. I would not urge the
principle of rotation, if I believed the consequence would be an
uninformed federal legislature; but I have no apprehension of this in
this enlightened country. The members of congress, at any one time, must
be but very few, compared with the respectable well informed men in the
United States; and I have no idea there will be any want of such men for
members of congress, though by a principle of rotation the constitution
should exclude from being elected for two years those federal
legislators, who may have served the four years immediately preceding,
or any four years in the six preceding years. If we may judge from
experience and fair calculations, this principle will never operate to
exclude at any one period a fifteenth part, even of those men who have
been members of congress. Though no man can sit in congress, by the
confederation, more than three years in any term of six years, yet not
more than three, four, or five men in any one state, have been made
ineligible at any one period; and if a good man happen to be excluded by
this rotation, it is only for a short time. All things considered, the
inconveniencies of the principle must be very inconsiderable compared
with the many advantages of it. It will generally be expedient for a man
who has served four years in congress to return home, mix with the
people, and reside some time with them: this will tend to reinstate him
in the interests, feelings, and views similar to theirs, and thereby
confirm in him the essential qualifications of a legislator. Even in
point of information, it may be observed, the useful information of
legislators is not acquired merely in studies in offices, and in meeting
to make laws from day to day; they must learn the actual situation of
the people, by being among them, and when they have made laws, return
home, and observe how they operate. Thus occasionally to be among the
people, is not only necessary to prevent or banish the callous habits
and self interested views of office in legislators, but to afford them
necessary information, and to render them useful: another valuable end
is answered by it, sympathy, and the means of communication between them
and their constituents, is substantially promoted; so that on every
principle legislators, at certain periods, ought to live among their
constituents.
Some men of science are undoubtedly necessary in every legislature; but
the knowledge, generally, necessary for men who make laws, is a
knowledge of the common concerns, and particular circumstances of the
people. In a republican government seats in the legislature are highly
honorable; I believe but few do, and surely none ought to consider them
as places of profit and permanent support. Were the people always
properly attentive, they would, at proper periods, call their law makers
home, by sending others in their room: but this is not often the case,
and therefore, in making constitutions, when the people are attentive,
they ought cautiously to provide for those benefits, those advantageous
changes in the administration of their affairs, which they are often apt
to be inattentive to in practice. On the whole, to guard against the
evils, and to secure the advantages I have mentioned, with the greatest
degree of certainty, we ought clearly, in my opinion, to increase the
federal representation, to secure elections on proper principles, to
establish a right to recall members, and a rotation among them.
Storing, Herbert J., ed. The Complete Anti-Federalist. 7 vols. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1981.
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